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Abstract
We describe an algorithm for Byzantine agreement that is scalable in the sense that each pro-
cessor sends only O˜(
√
n) bits, where n is the total number of processors. Our algorithm succeeds
with high probability against an adaptive adversary, which can take over processors at any time
during the protocol, up to the point of taking over arbitrarily close to a 1/3 fraction. We assume
synchronous communication but a rushing adversary. Moreover, our algorithm works in the pres-
ence of flooding: processors controlled by the adversary can send out any number of messages.
We assume the existence of private channels between all pairs of processors but make no other
cryptographic assumptions. Finally, our algorithm has latency that is polylogarithmic in n. To the
best of our knowledge, ours is the first algorithm to solve Byzantine agreement against an adaptive
adversary, while requiring o(n2) total bits of communication.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a rapid increase in the number of networks that are characterized by large sizes
and little admission control. Such networks are open to attacks by malicious users, who may subvert
the network for their own gain. To address this problem, the research community has been recently
revisiting techniques for dealing with nodes under the control of a malicious adversary [19, 8, 9, 5].
The Byzantine agreement problem, defined in 1982, is the sine qua non of handling malicious
nodes. With a solution to Byzantine agreement, it is possible to create a network that is reliable,
even when its components are not. Without a solution, a compromised network cannot perform even
the most basic computations reliably. A testament to the continued importance of the problem is its
appearance in modern domains such as sensor networks [23]; mediation in game theory [1, 2]; grid
computing [5]; peer-to-peer networks [22]; and cloud computing [25]. However, despite decades of
work and thousands of papers, we still have no practical solution to Byzantine agreement for large
networks. One impediment to practicality is suggested by the following quotes from recent systems
papers (see also [6, 20, 4, 3, 26]):
• “Unfortunately, Byzantine agreement requires a number of messages quadratic in the number of
participants, so it is infeasible for use in synchronizing a large number of replicas” [22]
• “Eventually batching cannot compensate for the quadratic number of messages [of Practical
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)]” [10]
• “The communication overhead of Byzantine Agreement is inherently large” [7]
In this paper, we describe an algorithm for Byzantine agreement with only O˜(n1/2) bit communi-
cation per processor overhead. Our techniques also lead to solutions with O˜(n1/2) bit complexity for
universe reduction and a problem we call the global coin subsequence problem, generating a polylog-
arithmic length string, most of which are global coinflips generated uniformly and independently at
random and agreed upon by all the good processors . Our protocols are polylogarithmic in time and,
succeed with high probability.1
We overcome the lower bound of [11] by allowing for a small probability of error. This is necessary
since this lower bound also implies that any randomized algorithm which always uses no more than
o(n2) messages must necessarily err with positive probability, since the adversary can guess the random
coinflips and achieve the lower bound if the guess is correct.
1.1 Model and Problem Definition
We assume a fully connected network of n processors, whose IDs are common knowledge. Each pro-
cessor has a private coin. We assume that all communication channels are private and that whenever
a processor sends a message directly to another, the identity of the sender is known to the recipient,
but we otherwise make no cryptographic assumptions. We assume an adaptive adversary. That is,
the adversary can take over processors at any point during the protocol up to the point of taking over
up to a 1/3 −  fraction of the processors for any positive constant . The adversary is malicious: it
chooses the input bits of every processor, bad processors can engage in any kind of deviations from
the protocol, including false messages and collusion, or crash failures, while the remaining processors
are good and follow the protocol. Bad processors can send any number of messages.
We assume a synchronous model of communication. In particular, we assume there is a known
upper bound on the transit time of any message and communication proceeds in rounds determined by
this transit time. The time complexity of our protocols are given in the number of rounds. However,
we assume a rushing adversary that gets to control the order in which messages are delivered in each
1That is probability 1− 1/nk for any fixed k
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round. In particular, the adversary can receive all the messages sent by good processors before sending
out its own messages.
In the Byzantine agreement problem, each processor begins with either a 0 or 1. An execution of a
protocol is successful if all processors terminate and, upon termination, agree on a bit held by at least
one good processor at the start.
The global coin subsequence (s, t) problem generates a string of length s words, t of which are
global coinflips generated uniformly and independently at random and agreed upon by all the good
processors . We call s an unreliable global coin sequence.
1.2 Results
We use the phrase with high probability (w.h.p.) to mean that an event happens with probability at
least 1−1/nc for every constant c and sufficiently large n. For readability, we treat log n as an integer
throughout.
In all of our results, n is the number of processors in a synchronous message passing model with
an adaptive, rushing adversary that controls less than 1/3−  fraction of processors, for any positive
constant  We have three main results. The first result makes use of the second and third ones, but
these latter two results may be of independent interest. First, we show:
Theorem 1 [Byzantine agreement] There exists a protocol which w.h.p. computes Byzantine
agreement, runs in polylogarithmic time, and uses O˜(n1/2) bits of communication.
Our second result concerns almost-everywhere Byzantine agreement and, almost-everywhere global
coin subsequence where a (1− 1/ log n) fraction of the good processors come to agreement on a good
processor’s input bit, or the random coin flip, resp.
Theorem 2 [Almost Everywhere Byzantine agreement] For any  > 0, there exists a protocol
which w.h.p. computes almost -everywhere Byzantine agreement, runs in time O((log4+ / log logn)
and uses O˜(n4/) bits of communication per processor. In addition, this protocol can be used to solve an
almost everywhere global coin subsequence (s, 2s/3) problem for an additional cost of O(log n/ log logn)
time and O˜(n4/) bits of communication per bit of s.
Our third result is used as a subroutine of the previous protocol.
Theorem 3 [Almost Everywhere Byzantine Agreement with Unreliable Global Coins]
Let S be a sequence of length s containing a subsequence of uniformly and independent random coinflips
of length t known to 1− O(1/ log n) good processors. Let C1 and C2 be any positive constants. Then
there is a protocol which runs in time O(s) with bit complexity O(log n) such that with probability at
least 1 − e−C1n + 1/2t, all but C2n/ log n of the good processors commit to the same vote b, where b
was the input of at least one good processor.
Our final result concerns going from almost-everywhere Byzantine agreement to everywhere Byzan-
tine agreement. It makes use of a simple consequence of our first result which is that not only can
almost all of the processors reach agreement on a bit, but they can also generate a random bit. We
actually prove a result below that is stronger than what is necessary to establish Theorem 1.
Theorem 4 Assume n/2 + n good processors agree on a message M and there is an oracle which
can generate each bit of a global coin subsequence (s, t) in O(1) time where t > c log n. Then there is
a protocol that ensures with probability 1 − 1/nc that all good processors output M and n. Moreover
this protocol runs in O(s log n) time and uses O˜(sn1/2) bits of communication per processor.
1.3 Techniques
Our protocol uses a sparse network construction and tournament tree similar to the network and tour-
nament network in [17]. This past result gives a bandwidth efficient Byzantine agreement algorithm
for a non-adaptive adversary, which must take over all its processors at the start of the algorithm.
2
The basic idea of the algorithm from [17] is that processors compete in local elections in a tournament
network, where the winners advance to the next highest level, until finally a small set is elected that
is representative in the sense that the fraction of bad processors in this set is not much more than the
fraction of bad processors in the general population.
This election approach is prima facie impossible with an adaptive adversary, which can simply wait
until a small set is elected and then can take over all processors in that set. To avoid this problem,
we make use of two novel techniques. First, instead of electing processors, we elect arrays of random
numbers, each generated initially by a processor. Second, we use secret sharing on these arrays to
make sure that 1) the arrays are split among increasingly larger numbers of processors as the array is
elected higher up in the tournament; and 2) the secrets in the arrays cannot be reconstructed except
at the appropriate time in the protocol. Critical to our approach is the need to iteratively reapply
secret sharing on shares of secrets that were computed previously, in order to increase the number of
shares when necessary in the protocol.
Another contribution of this paper is the algorithm we use to run an election. In [17], elections were
run by participants. These elections used Feige’s bin selection protocol [12] and a Byzantine agreement
algorithm run among the small group of participants to agree on the bin selected by everyone. Because
we are now faced with an adaptive adversary, this approach fails. In particular, we must now have
a much larger sets of processors which come to agreement on the bins selected in Feige’s protocol.
To achieve this, we make use of Rabin’s algorithm [21] run on a sparse network. To run Rabin’s
algorithm, we supply it with an almost everywhere global coin sequence, where coinflips are generated
from the arrays described above.
Our final new technique is a simple but not obvious protocol for going from almost-everywhere
Byzantine agreement and the global coin subsequence problem to everywhere Byzantine agreement
with an adaptive adversary. A past result [16] shows that it is possible to do this with a non-adaptive
adversary, even without private channels. However, the technique presented in this paper for solving
the problem with an adaptive adversary is significantly different than the approach from [16].
In Section 3, we describe the almost everywhere Byzantine agreement and global coin subsequence
protocols. The scalable version of Rabin’s algorithm is in Section A.2. In Section 4, we describe the
almost everywhere to everywhere protocol.
2 Related work
As mentioned previously, this paper builds on a result from [17] that gives a polylogarithmic time
protocol with polylogarithmic bits of communication per processor for almost everywhere Byzantine
agreement, leader election, and universe reduction in the synchronous full information message passing
model with a nonadaptive rushing adversary.
Almost everywhere agreement in sparse networks has been studied since 1986. See [17, 18] for
references. The problem of almost everywhere agreement for secure multiparty computation on a
partially connected network was defined and solved in 2008 in [13], albeit with Ω(n2) message cost.
In [18], the authors give a sparse network implementation of their protocols from [17]. It is easy to
see that everywhere agreement is impossible in a sparse network where the number of faulty processors
t is sufficient to surround a good processor. A protocol in which processors use o(n) bits may seem
as vulnerable to being isolated as in a sparse network, but the difference is that without access to
private random bits, the adversary can’t anticipate at the start of the protocol where communication
will occur. In [14], it is shown that even with private channels, if a processor must pre-specify the
set of processors it is willing to listen to at the start of a round, where its choice in each round can
depend on the outcome of its random coin tosses, at least one processor must send Ω(n1/3) messages
to compute Byzantine agreement with probability at least 1/2 + 1/ log n. Hence the only hope for
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a protocol where every processor sends o(n1/3) messages is to design outside this constraint. Note
that the Almost Everywhere Byzantine Agreement protocol falls within this restrictive model, but the
Almost Everywhere to Everywhere protocol does not, as the decision of whether a message is listened
to (or acted upon) depends on how many messages carrying a certain value are received so far.
3 Almost everywhere protocol
We first outline the protocol. We label the processors p1, p2, . . . , pn. The processors are arranged into
nodes in a q-ary tree. Each processor appears in polylogarithmic places in each level of the tree, in a
manner that will be described below. The levels of the tree are numbered from the leaf nodes (level
1) to the root (level `∗). In addition, each processor, pi, generates an array of random bits, consisting
of one block for each level of the network and secret shares this with the processors in the ith node on
level 1.
Each node in the tree runs an election among r arrays whereby a subset of w arrays are selected.
In order to run this election at level `, the ` block of each array supplies a random bin choice and
random bits to run almost everywhere Byzantine agreement with common global coins to agree on
each bin choice of every competing array. It suffices that some of these coins are random and known
almost everywhere. The shares of the remaining blocks of arrays which remain in the competition are
further subdivided into more shares and sent to the parent (and erased from the current processors’
memories.) In this way, the more important the arrays, the more processors need to be taken over to
prevent its correct operation.
Random bits are revealed as needed by sending the iterated shares of secrets down to all the leaves
of the subtree rooted where the election is taking place, collecting `-shares at each level ` − 1 to
reconstruct `− 1 shares. In the level 1 nodes, each processor sends the other processors its share.
The winning arrays of a node’s election compete in elections at the next higher level. At the root
there are a small number of arrays left to run almost everywhere Byzantine Agreement with a global
coin.
The method of secret sharing and iterative secret sharing is described in Section 3.1. Networks
and communication protocols are described in Section 3.2; the election routine is described in Section
3.3. The procedure for running almost everywhere Byzantine Agreement with unreliable coins is
described in Section A.2. The main procedure for almost everywhere Byzantine agreement is in 3.4.
The extension of the almost everywhere Byzantine Agreement protocol to a solution for the global
coin subsequence problem is in Section 3.5. Finally the analysis and correctness proof can be found
in Sections 3.6 and 3.7, respectively.
3.1 Secret sharing
We assume any (non-verifiable) secret sharing scheme which is a (n, t+ 1) threshold scheme. That is,
each of n players are given shares of size proportional to the message M and t+ 1 shares are required
to reconstruct M . Every message which is the size of M is consistent with any subset of t or fewer
shares, so no information as to the contents of M is gained about the secret from holding fewer than
t + 1 shares. See [24] for details on constructing such a scheme. We will make extensive use of the
following definition.
Definition 1 secretShare(s): To share a secret sequence of words s with n1 processes (including itself)
of which t1 may be corrupt, a processor (dealer) creates and distributes shares of each of the words
using a (n1, t1 + 1) secret sharing mechanism. Note that if a processor knows a share of a secret, it
can treat that share as a secret. To share that share with n2 processors of which at most t2 processors
are corrupt, it creates and distributes shares of the share using a (n2, t2 + 1) mechanism and deletes
its original share from memory. This can be iterated many times. We define a 1-share of a secret to
be a share of a secret and an i-share of a secret to be a share of an i− 1-share of a secret.
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To reveal a secret sequence s, all processors which receive a share of s from a dealer sends this shares
to a processor p which computes the secret. This also may be iterated to first reconstruct i− 1 shares
from i shares, etc., and eventually the secret sequence. In this paper we assume secret sharing schemes
with t = n/2. (This is quite robust, as any t ∈ [1/3, 2/3] would work.)
Lemma 1 If a secret is shared in this manner up to i iterations, then an adversary which possesses
ti shares of each i-share learns no information about the secret.
Proof: The proof is by induction. For level 1, it is true by definition of secret sharing. Suppose it is
true up to i iterations.
Let v be any value. By induction, it is consistent with the known tj shares on all levels j ≤ i
and some assignment Si of values to sets of unknown ni − ti i-shares. Then consider the shares of
these shares that have been spread to level i + 1. For each value of an i-share given by Si, there is
an assignment Si+1 of values to the unknown ni+1 − ti+1 shares consistent with the ti+1 i+ 1- known
shares. Hence knowing in addition the ti+1 i+1-shares of each i-share does not reveal any information
about the secret. uunionsq
3.2 Network and Communication
We first describe the topology of the network and then the communications protoocols.
3.2.1 Samplers
Key to the construction of the network is the definition of an averaging sampler which was also used
heavily in [15, 18]. We repeat the definition here for convenience.
Our protocols rely on the use of averaging (or oblivious) samplers, families of bipartite graphs
which define subsets of elements such that all but a small number contain at most a fraction of “bad”
elements close to the fraction of bad elements of the entire set. We assume either a nonuniform model
in which each processor has a copy of the required samplers for a given input size, or else that each
processor initializes by constructing the required samplers in exponential time.
Definition 2 Let ,[r] denote the set of integers {1, . . . , r}, and [s]d the multisets of size d consisting
of elements of [s]. Let H : [r]→ [s]d be a function assigning multisets of size d to integers. We define
the intersection of a multiset A and a set B to be the number of elements of A which are in B.
H is a (θ, δ) sampler if for every set S ⊂ [s] at most a δ fraction of all inputs x have |H(x)∩S|d >
|S|
s + θ.
The following lemma establishing the existence of samplers can be shown using the probabilistic
method. For s′ ∈ [s], let deg(s′) = |r′ ∈ [r] | s.t. s ∈ H(r′)}|. A slight modification of Lemma 2 in [15]
yields:
Lemma 2 For every r, s, d, θ, δ > 0 such that 2 log2(e) ·dθ2δ > s/r+1−δ, there exists a (θ, δ) sampler
H : [r]→ [s]d and for all s ∈ [s], deg(s) < O((rd/s) log n).
For this paper we will use the term sampler to refer to a (1/ log n, 1/ log n) sampler, where d =
O((s/r + 1) log3 n).
3.2.2 Network structure
Let P be the set of all n processors. The network is structured as a complete q-ary tree. The level 1
nodes (leaves) contain k1 = log
3 n processors. Each node at height ` > 1 contains k` = q
`k1 processors;
there are (n/k`) log
3 n nodes on level `; and the root node at height `∗ = logq(n/k1) contains all the
processors. There are n leaves, each assigned to a different processor. The contents of each node on
level ` is determined by a sampler where [r] is the set of nodes, [s] = P and d = k`.
The edges in the network are of three types:
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1. Uplinks: The uplinks from processors in a child node on level ` to processors in a parent node
on level ` + 1 are determined by a sampler of degree d = q log3 n, [r] is the set of processors in
the child node and [s] is the set of processors in the parent node.
2. `− links: The `− links between processors in a node C at level ` to C’s descendants at level 1 is
determined by a sampler with [r] the set of processor in the node C, [s] C’s level 1 descendants,
and d a subset of size O(log3 n). Here, r = q`k1; s = q
`; d = O(log3 n) and the maximum number
of `− links incident to a level 1 node is O(k1 log4 n).
3. Links between processors in a node are also determined by a sampler of polylogarithmic degree.
These are described in the Almost Everywhere Byzantine Agreement with Global Coin protocol.
From the properties of samplers, we have:
1. Fewer than a 1/ log n fraction of the nodes on any level contain less than a 2/3 + /2 fraction of
good processors (we call such nodes bad nodes).
2. There are fewer than a 1/ log n fraction of processors in every node whose uplinks are connected
to fewer than a 2/3 + − 1/ log n fraction of good processors, unless the parent or child, resp. is
a bad node.
3. There are fewer than a 1/ log n fraction of processors in a node which are connected through
`− links to a majority of bad nodes on level 1, in any subtree which has fewer than a 1/2 = ,
fraction of bad level 1 nodes.
3.2.3 Communication protocols
We use the following three subroutines for communication. Initially each processor pi shares its secret
with all the processors in the ith node at level 1.
sendSecretUp(s): To send up a secret sequence s, a processor in a node uses secretShare(s) to send to
each of its neighbors in its parent node (those connected by uplinks) a share of s. Then the processor
erases s from its own memory.
sendDown(s, i): After a secret sequence has been passed up a path to a node C, the secret sequence
is passed down to the processors in the 1-nodes in the subtree. To send a secret sequence s down
the tree, each processor in a node C on level i sends its i-shares of s down the uplinks it came from
plus the corresponding uplinks from each of its other children. The processors on level i− 1 receiving
the i-shares use these shares to reconstruct i − 1-shares of s. This is repeated for lower levels until
all the 2-shares are received by the processors in all the level 1 nodes in C’s subtree. The processors
in the 1-node each send each other all their shares and reconstruct the secrets received. Note that
a processor may have received an i-share generated from more than one i − 1 share because of the
overlapping of sets (of uplinks) in the sampler.
sendOpen(s, `) : This procedure is used by a node C on any level ` to learn a sequence s held by the
set of level 1 nodes in C’s subtree. Each processor in the level 1 node A sends s up the `− links from
A to a subset of processors in C. A processor in C receiving s from each of the processors in a level 1
node takes a majority to determine the node’s version of s. Then it takes a majority over the values
obtained from each of the level 1 nodes it is linked to.
3.2.4 Correctness of communications
Definition 3 A good node is a node with at least 2/3 + /2 fraction of good processors and a bad node
is a node which is not good. (Note that for the lemma below, it suffices that that a good node contain
a 1/2 +  fraction of good processors) A good path up the tree is a path from leaf to root which has no
nodes which become bad during the protocol.
6
Lemma 3 1. If sendSecretUp(s) is executed up a path in the tree and if the adversary learns the
secret s, there must be at least one bad node on that path.
2. Assume that s is generated by a good processor and sendSecretUp(s) is executed up a good path
in a tree to a node A on level `, followed by sendDown(s, `) and then sendOpen(s). Further
assume there are at least a 1/2 +  fraction of nodes among A’s descendants on level 1 which are
good, and whose paths to A are good. Then a 1 − 1/ log n fraction of the good processors in A
learn s.
Proof: In the protocol any secret shared to a good node on level 1 remains hidden from the adversary
which receives no more than a 1/3−  fraction of the shares. If it is passed to a good node on level 2,
then since the uplinks are determined by a (1/ log n, 1/ log n)-sampler, no more than 1/ log n fraction
of the uplink sets contain more than 1/3 fraction of bad processors. Hence no more than an additional
1/ log n fraction of the 1-shares are revealed because the adversary has too many 2-shares. Similarly,
no more than an additional 1/ log n fraction of the 2-shares are revealed because the adversary has too
many 3-shares. Hence if the secret is passed up a good path, the adversary does not gain more than
`∗/ log n additional shares of the secret, or O(1/ log logn) of the shares, for a total less than 1/3− /2
fraction. Thus by Lemma 1 the adversary has no knowledge of any secret that is sent up a good path
until that secret is released.
We consider a secret released when it is first sent down from a nodeA. A secret will be reconstructed
by a processor when it is passed down good paths along the uplinks as 2/3 of all its shares are returned
down the good paths to the leaves. If there are at least 1/2 +  fraction of level 1 nodes which are
good and whose paths to A are good, then a 1 − 1/ log n fraction of the good processors in A have
`− links from a majority of 1-level nodes which have received the correct sequence. uunionsq
3.3 Election
Here we describe Feige’s election procedure [12], adapted to this context. We assume r candidates are
competing in the election. The election algorithm is given below.
Definition 4 Let numBins = r/(5c log3 n), and let a word consist of log numBins bits. A block B is
a sequence of bits, beginning with an initial word (bin choice) B(0) followed by r words B(1), B(2), .., B(r),
which will be used as coins in running Byzantine agreement on each bit of the bin choices for each of
the r candidates. The input to an election is a set of r candidate blocks labelled B1, ..., Br. The output
is a set of r/numBins indices W . Let w = |W | = 5c log3 n.
Algorithm 1 Election Protocol
1. In parallel, for i = 1, ..., r, the processors run almost everywhere Byzantine agreement on the
bin choice of each of the r candidate blocks. Round j of the Byzantine agreement protocol to
determine i’s bin choice is run using the ith word of the jth processor’s block Bj(i). Let b1, ..., br
be the decided bin choices.
2. Let min = min{i | ∑j Bj(0) = i}. Then W ← {j | Bj(0) = min}. If |W | < r/numBins then
W is augmented by adding the first r/numBins− |W | indices that would otherwise be omitted.
If we assume that the bin choices are agreed upon by all processors then Feige’s result for the
atomic broadcast model holds:
Lemma 4 [12] Let S be the set of bin choices generated independently at random. Then even if
the adversary sets the remaining bits after seeing the bin choices of S, with probability at least 1 −
2−2|S|/(3numBins) there are at least (1/numBins − )|S| winners from S. E.g., if |S| > 2/3r and
r/numBins > 5c log3 n then with probability 1 − 1/nc the fraction of winners from S is at least
|S|/r − 1/ log n.
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Figure 1: Left: Example run of Algorithm 2 on a small tree; Right: Communication in different phases
of Algorithm 2 for a fixed level `.
3.4 Main protocol for Almost Everywhere Byzantine Agreement
The main protocol for Almost Everywhere Byzantine Agreement is given as Algorithm 2. Figure
1, which we now describe, outlines the main ideas behind the algorithm. The left part of Figure 1
illustrates the algorithm when run on a 3-ary network tree. The processors are represented with the
numbers 1 through 9 and the ovals represent the nodes of the network, where a link between a pair
of nodes illustrates a parent child relationship. The numbers in the bottom part of each node are the
processors contained in that nodes. Note that the size of these sets increase as we go up tree. Further
note that each processor is contained in more than one node at a given level. The numbers in the top
part of each node represent the processors whose blocks are candidates at that node. Note that the
size of this set remains constant (3) as we go from level 2 to level 3. Further note that each processor
is a candidate in at most one node at a given level.
The right part of Figure 1 illustrates communication in Algorithm 2 for an election occurring at
a fixed node at level `. Time moves from left to right in this figure and the levels of the network
are increasing from bottom to top. Salient points in this figure are as follows. First, bin choices are
revealed by (1) communication in the sendDown protocol that moves hop by hop from level ` down
to level 1 in the network and (2) communication in the sendOpen protocol that proceeds directly
from the level 1 leaf nodes to the level ` nodes. Second, Byzantine agreement occurs at level `, via
communication between the processors in the node at level ` and communication down and up the
network in order to expose the coins, one after another, as needed in the course of the Byzantine
agreement algorithm. Finally, shares of the blocks of the winners of the election at the node at level
` are sent up to the parent node at level `+ 1.
3.5 Modification to output a sequence of mostly random bits
The Almost Everywhere Byzantine Agreement can be modified easily to solve the global coin sub-
sequence (s, 2S/3) for s a sequence of wq words. Add one more block of the desired length to each
processor’s array at the start. At level `∗, use sendDown and sendOpen to recover each word, one
from each of the wq contestants. The time and bit complexity is given in Theorem 2.
3.6 Bit complexity and running time analysis
The proof of the following lemma is given in Section A.1
Lemma 5 For any δ > 0, Almost Everywhere Byzantine Agreement protocol runs in O˜(n4/δ) bits and
time O((log n)4+δ/ log logn)).
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Algorithm 2 Almost Everywhere Byzantine Agreement
1. For all i in parallel
(a) Each processor pi generates an array of ` blocks Bi and uses secretshare to share its array
with the ith level 1 node;
(b) Each processor in the ith level 1 node uses sendSecretUp to share its 1-share of Bi with its
parent node and then erases its shares from memory.
2. Repeat for ` = 2 to `∗ − 1
(a) For each processor in each node C on level `:
for t = 1, ..., w and i = 1, ..., q − 1, let B(i−1)w+t be the tth array sent up from child i. ( If
` = 2 then w = 1 )
W ← B1||B2||...||Br
Let F be the sequence of first blocks of the arrays of W , i.e., the ith array of F is the
first block of ith array of W . Let S be the sequence of the remaining blocks of each array of W .
Expose bin choices:
In parallel, for all candidates i = 1, 2, .., r
i. sendDown(Fi(1));
ii. sendOpen(Fi(1), `).
(b) Agree on bin choices:
If ` < `∗ then for rounds i = 1, ..., r
i. Expose coin flips: Generate r coinflips for the ith round of Byzantine agreement to
decide each of r bin choices.
In parallel, for all contestants j = 1, .., r
A. sendDown(Fi(j)); upon receiving all 1-shares, level 1 processors compute the secret
bits Fi(j));
B. sendOpen(Fi(j), `).
ii. Run the ith round of a.e. Byzantine agreement in parallel to decide the bin choice of all
contestants.
(c) Send Shares of Winners: Let W be the winners of the election decided from the previous
step (the lightest bin). Let S′ be the subsequence of S from W ; All processors in a node at
level ` use sendSecretUp(S′) to send S′ to its parent node and erase S′ from memory.
3. All processes in the single node on level `∗ run a.e. Byzantine agreement once using their initial
inputs as inputs to the protocol (instead of bin choices) and the remaining block of each contes-
tant. (Note that only two bits of this block are needed.)
For rounds i = 1, 2, ..., qw,
(a) sendDown(Fi(2), i);
(b) sendOpen(Fi(2), `).
(c) Use Fi(2) to run the i
th round of a.e. Byzantine agreement.
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3.7 Proof of correctness
An election is good at a node A if the processors can carry out a.e. Byzantine agreement and a
1− 1/ log n fraction of good processors agree on the result. Recall that the a.e. Byzantine agreement
with common coins protocol succeeds w.h.p., if 2/3 +  fraction of processors in the node are good and
bits can be generated so that at least c log n are random and for each of these, there is a fraction of
1− 1/ log n fraction of good processors which agree on it. Then an election is good if (1) A is a good
node; (2) at least c log n contestants are good processors pi with good paths from the assigned i
th level
1 node to A so that that secrets are correctly transmitted up the tree without the adversary learning
the secret until it it released; and (3) there must be a 1/2 +  fraction of level 1 nodes in A’s subtree
which have good paths to A, so that a 1− 1/ log n fraction of good processors in A learn the random
bin selections and random bits of the good arrays that are competing. Finally, if fewer than c log3 n
good arrays compete in an election, the probability of correctness of the election is diminished, see
Section 3.3.
Condition (3) is sufficient to show that between the time the secret is released and the time the
processors in the node A learn the secret, the adversary can not selectively decide to prevent the secret
from being learned by taking over the processors which know the secret. As all the secrets are sent
down together to all the descendants of A, to prevent learning of a secret at A, the adversary must
prevent a majority of level 1 nodes from hearing from A. This would require taking over enough nodes
so that half the paths from A to the leaves have at least one bad node in them, in which case we
would view the election as bad and all arrays contending in it bad. While the adversary does have the
ability to selectively make bad an entire election, this does not significantly affect the number of good
arrays, since with high probability all elections return a representative fraction of good arrays. See
Section 3.3. Nor does it affect the random bits which are later to be revealed, as these remain hidden
from the adversary. See Section 3.2.4.
We now lower bound the fraction of arrays which remain which are good.
Lemma 6 At least a 2/3− 7`/ log n fraction of winning arrays are good on every level `, that is, they
are generated by good processors and they are known by 1−O(1/ log n) fraction of good processors in
their election node. In particular, the protocol can be used to generate a sequence of random words, of
length r = wq of which a 2/3 + − 5/ log logn fraction are random and known to 1− 1/ log n fraction
of good processors.
Proof: With high probability, each good election causes an increase of no more than a 1/ log n in the
fraction of bad arrays, unless there are too few (< c log3 n) good arrays participating. But the latter
cannot happen too often. Let r be the number of contestants. If there are f bad arrays overall on level
` then the total number of such lop-sided elections is less than f/(r− c log3 n). A representative set of
winners would have c log3 n/r fraction of good arrays. Since the number of candidates r = wq > log7,
the fraction of good arrays lost this way is less than 1/ log4 n. So in total, the fraction of arrays which
are good decreases by no more than 2/ log n on a given level because of good election results.
We now examine the effect of bad nodes. Each node makes bad any paths that run through it. A
fraction of 1/ log n level 1 nodes are bad. In the worst case, all arrays that pass through bad nodes
and bad elections are good. Hence a 1/ log n fraction of bad nodes may eliminate a (3/2) log n fraction
of good arrays on level 1 and be responsible for making a 2/ log n fraction of elections bad in any level
by making bad half the paths of those elections, thus eliminating an additional fraction of 1/ log n
good arrays. On level 2, an additional (5/2)/ log n fraction of elections may be made bad by the bad
nodes in that level and so on. Each bad election eliminates all good arrays which pass through it.
Note that a bad election does not make additional paths bad, as information and secrets can still be
passed through a good node that holds a bad election.
Initially a 2/3 +  fraction of the arrays are good. Assuming this is true, the bad elections may
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eliminate no more than (5/2)/ log n fraction of good arrays. Thus the fraction of elections which
become bad on level `∗ is no more than a total of less than 5`∗/ log n = 5/ log log n. Hence the fraction
of good arrays at the root node is as stated. uunionsq
4 Almost Everywhere to Everywhere
We call a processor knowledgeable if it is good and agrees on a message m. Otherwise, if it is good,
it is confused. We assume that almost all , i.e., (1/2 + )n, of the processors are knowledgeable and
can come to agreement on a random number k in [1, ...,
√
n]. We assume private channels. Here is the
protocol.
Algorithm 3 Almost Everywhere To Everywhere with Global Coin
1. Each processor p does the following in parallel:
Randomly pick i ∈ [1, 2., , ,√n] and j ∈ [1, ..., n], and send a request label i to processor j.
2. Almost all good processors agree on a random number k in [1, ...,
√
n].
3. For each processor p, if p receives request label i from q and i = k then if p has not received more
than
√
n log n such messages (it is not overloaded) , p returns a message to q,
4. Let ki be the number of messages returned to p by processors sent the request label i. Let imax
be an i such that ki ≥ kj for all j}}. If the same message m is returned by (1/2 + 3/8)a log n
processors which were sent the request label imax then p decides m.
4.1 Proof of correctness
Lemma 7 Assume at the start of the protocol n/2 + n good processors agree on a message M and
can generate a random bit. Let c be any constant ¿ 0. Then after a single execution of the loop:
1. With probability 4/( log n)− 1/nc, this protocol results in agreement on M .
2. With probability 1− 1/nc, every processor either agrees on M or is undecided.
To prove Lemma 7 we first prove two other lemmas.
Lemma 8 Suppose there are (1/2 + )n knowledgeable processors. W.h.p., for any one loop, for every
processor p and every request label i, at least A = (1/2 + /2)a log n processors which are sent i by p
are knowledgeable and fewer than B = (1/2− /2)a log n processors which are sent i by p are corrupt
or confused.
Proof: Since there are private channels, the adversary does not know p’s requests other than those
sent to bad processors . Hence the choice of the set of processors which are not knowledgeable
is independent of the queries, and each event consisting of a processor querying a knowledgeable
processor is an independent random variable.
Let X be the number of knowledgeable processors sent a value i by processor p. E[X] =
a log n(1/2 + ). Since X is the sum of independent random variables we use Chernoff bounds:
Pr[X < (1− /2)E[X] ≤ e(2/8)(a logn(1/2+) ≤ na2/16) which is less than n−2c for a = 32c/2.
Taking a union bound over all i and processors p, for all X, Pr(X < (1 − /2)E[X]) is less than√
n(n)n−2c < 1/n−c. The second part of Lemma 8 is shown similarly. uunionsq
Lemma 8 immediately implies statement (2) of Lemma 7.
We now show Lemma 7 (1). A knowledgeable processor p which is sent i = k will respond unless
overloaded. Each processor can receive no more than n−1 requests, or the sender is evidently corrupt.
Then there can be no more than
√
n/ log n values of i for which there are more than
√
n log n requests
labelled i. Then we claim:
Lemma 9 The probability that more than n/4 knowledgeable processors are overloaded is less than
4/( log n).
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Proof: We call a value i for a processor overloaded if
√
n log n request labels equal i. A processor is
only overloaded if k = i and i is overloaded. Since k is randomly chosen, each processor has at most
a 1/ log n chance of being overloaded. Let X be the number of overloaded knowledgeable processors
and Y be the number of knowledgeable processors. Then E[X] = Y/logn. Using Markov’s Inequality,
Pr[X ≥ Y (/4)] < (Y/ log n)/(Y /4) = 4/( log n). uunionsq
Similar to the argument above, because the adversary does not know the requests and request labels
of the requests sent to knowledgeable processors, the event sof choosing knowledgeable processors which
are not overloaded are independent random variables and Chernoff bounds apply. With probability
4/( log n), there are (1/2 + 3/4n) knowledgeable processors which are not overloaded. Setting  to
3/4 in Lemma 8, we have w.h.p., for every processor and request label i that A = (1/2 + 3/8)a log n
processor and B = (1/2− 3/8)a log n. Therefore, with probability 4/( log n)− 1/nc, one loop of this
protocol results in agreement on M . As each repetitions of the loop are independent, the probability
that they all fail is the product of their individual failure probabilities, implying the following.
Lemma 10 Repeating the protocol X = (c/3) lnn times, the probability that all processors agree on
M and no processor outputs a different message is 1− 1/nc.
5 Everywhere Byzantine Agreement
We run the Almost Everywhere Agreement protocol modified as in Section 3.5 to solve the global coin
subsequence problem, i.e., it generates a polylogarithmic length sequence containing a subsequence of
c log n bits random numbers generated uniformly and independently at random which are known to
1−1/ log n processors and are in the range [1, ...,√n]. At each step below, GenerateSecretNumber(i)
generates the ith number in the sequence. Since the number of good random numbers is greater than
c lnn, the protocol is successful with probability 1− 1/nc.
Algorithm 4 Everywhere Byzantine Agreement
1. Run Almost Everywhere Byzantine Agreement to come to almost everywhere consensus on a
bit;
2. For i = 1 to wq do
(a) R← GenerateSecretNumber(i)
(b) Run AlmostEverywhereToEverywhere(R)
Finally, it is easy to see that each execution of the AlmostEverywhereToEverywhere takes O˜(
√
n)
bits per processor, which dominates the cost per processor. As there are polylogarithmic number (wq)
of rounds, the communication cost of EverywhereByzantineAgreement per processor remains O˜(
√
n)
bits while the time is polylogarithmic.
6 Conclusion
We have described an algorithm that solves the Byzantine agreement problem with each processor
sending only O˜(
√
n) bits. Our algorithm succeeds against an adaptive, rushing adversary in the
synchronous communication model. It assumes private communication channels but makes no other
cryptographic assumptions. Our algorithm succeeds with high probability and has latency that is
polylogarithmic in n. Several important problems remain including the following: Can we use o(
√
n)
bits per processor, or alternatively prove that Ω(
√
n) bits are necessary for agreement against an
adaptive adversary? Can we adapt our results to the asynchronous communication model? Can we
use the ideas in this paper to perform scalable, secure multi-party computation for other functions?
Finally, can the techniques in this paper be used to create a practical Byzantine agreement algorithm
for real-world, large networks?
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof: We first analyze running time. There are q rounds in the first execution of Step 2(c) and
q ∗ w rounds on the second and later executions of Step 2(c) and Step 2. Each round takes the time
needed to traverse up and down to the node running the election or O(`∗). The total running time is
O(`∗(q(w + 1))).
We now consider the number of bits communicated per processor. We note that each processor
appears in all node only polylogarithmic number of times. Hence it suffices to bound the cost per
appearance of processor in a node to get a O˜ result. Step 1 requires each processor to generate
q + (`∗ − 1)wq + 1 words. Each share takes the same number of bits as the secret shared, and there
are k1 shares. When a processor in a level 1 node receives its share, it shares it with its parent node
via q log3 n uplinks, for a total of O((q log3 n+ k1)(q + `
∗wq + 1)) words. sent by each processor.
In the first execution of Step 2 (a) and (b) , every processor in every node C on level 2 has 2-shares
of the q first blocks from its children, each containing q words. These are sent from every node C
on level 2 down its uplinks to processors in all its level 1 children, so that each processor in C sends
down O(q2dm) words in total. Here, dm is the maximum number of uplinks from a single child that
a processor in a node is incident to. The 1-shares are reconstructed from the 2-shares and then the
1-shares are shared with the other processors in the level 1 node, with each level 1 processor sending
q2 words in total.
Step 2(c) requires shares of arrays from w winners, or a total of (`∗−1)w blocks to be sent secretly
to the next level. Each block has size qw and is shared among Oq log3 n) processors, where d = q log3 n
is the number of a processor’s uplinks. for a total of O˜(`∗(wq)2)) words sent.
In the second execution of Step 2(b) and (c) all shares of all F blocks of all wq candidates are
sent down from C at level 3. Each processor has received 2-shares from O(d2mwq) candidates, hence
it sends down O˜(d2mwq) shares of blocks of size wq or a total of O((d
2
m(wq)
2) words. On level 1 the
2-shares are converted to 1-shares and each 1-share is sent to k1 processors, for a total of (wq)
2 words
sent to k1 processors or O(k1(wq)
2) words sent. The processors in level 1 nodes each determine (wq)2
numbers which they communicate back to the level 3 nodes via the `− links to their neighbors in C.
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Since each level 1 node is incident to q˜) ` − links, for any level ` node, the cost of this is O˜((w2q3)
words.
In the third execution of Step 2(b) and (c), again all shares of F blocks of all wq candidates are
sent down. Each has size wq and the analysis is similar, except for one item. As the levels increase
to level `, the number of candidates from which a candidate has received `-shares increases by a dm
factor. Hence, each processor at level ` sends down O((d`m(wq)
2) words.
Step 3 is dominated by Step 2.
The total number of bits sent per processor is the number of times a processor appears in a node
on any level times the number of levels times the costs described above. These additional factors
for appearances and levels are subsumed by the˜notation as they are polylog . That is, the cost is
determined by summing up the above amounts with the exception of one term which increases per
level, that is,
∑
`(d
`
m(wq)
2)). Hence the cost is
O˜((q + k1)(q + `
∗wq) + `∗(wq)2 + k1(wg)2 + w2q3 +
∑
`
(d`m(wq)
2))
= O˜((w2q3 + 2d`
∗
m(wq)
2))
.
Since w = O(log3 n), `∗ = log(n/k1)/ log q, dm = c′ log4 n, and k1 to log3 n, then setting q =
(log n)δ, δ > 4, we have that the total cost is dominated by the last term and
d`
∗
m(wq)
2 = (c′ log4 n)log(n/k1)/ log q(wq)2
= 2log c
′+4 log logn)(log(n/k1)/ log q(c log3 nq)2 = O˜(n4/δ)
.
I.e., there is a running time of O(log(n/ log3 n)/ log logn)(log n)δ log3 n) = O((log n)4+δ) and a bit
complexity per processor of O˜(n4/δ). uunionsq
A.2 Almost Everywhere Byzantine Agreement (AEBA) with Unreliable Global Coins
Algorithm 5 AEBA with Unreliable Coins
Set vote← bi; For each round do the following:
1. Send vote to all neighbors in G;
2. Collect votes from neighbors in G;
3. maj ← majority bit among votes received;
4. fraction← fraction of votes received for maj;
5. coin← result of call to algorithm GetGlobalCoin;
6. If fraction ≥ (1− 0)(2/3 + /2) then vote← maj
7. else
(a) If coin = “heads”, then vote← 1, else vote← 0;
At the end of all rounds, commit to vote as the output bit;
A.3 Analysis
We assume here that the fraction of bad processors is no more than 1/3 +  for some fixed  > 0. For
a processor v, let N(v) be the set of neighbors of v in the sparse graph G and let n be the number of
nodes in this graph. We say that a call to GetGlobalCoin succeeds, when it selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1} with
uniform probability and independently from all past events, and that all but O(n/ log n) processors
learn b.
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Theorem 5 Assume there are at least r rounds in Algorithm 5 where the call to GetGlobalCoin
succeeds. Let C1 and C2 be any positive constants and k depend only on C1 and C2. Then, at the end
of the algorithm, for any positive constants C1 and C2 with probability at least 1 − e−C1n + 1/2r, all
but C2n/ log n of the good processors commit to the same vote b, where b was the input of at least one
good processor. This occurs provided that the graph G is a random k log n regular graph.
Before proving this theorem we establish the following lemmas.
For a fixed round, let b′ ∈ {0, 1} be the bit that the majority of good processors vote for in that
round. Let S′ be the set of good processors that will vote for b′ and let f ′ = |S′|/n. Let 0 be a fixed
positive constant to be determined later. We call a processor informed for the round if the fraction
value for that processor obeys the following inequalities:
(1− 0)f ′ ≤ fraction ≤ (1 + 0)(f ′ + 1/3− )
Lemma 11 For any fixed C1 and C2, with probability at least 1 − e−C1n, in any given round of
Algorithm 5, all but C2n/ log n of the good processors are informed, for G a k log n regular graph
where k depends only on C1, C2 and 0.
Proof: Fix the set S′, we know that S′ is of size at least 1/3(n + ) since at least half of the good
processors must vote for the majority bit. Let f ′ = |S′|/n. We will also fix a set T` which consists
of all the processors that have fraction < (1 − 0f ′). We will first show that the probability that T`
is of size Cn/2 log n for some constant C is very small for fixed S′ and T`, and will then show, via
a union bound, that with high probability, for any S′ there is no set of Cn/2 log n processors with
fraction < (1− 0f ′). Finally, we will use a similar technique to show that with high probability, no
more than Cn/2 log n processors have fraction > (1 + 0)(f
′ + 1/3). This will complete the proof.
To begin, we fix the set S′ of size at least 1/3(n+ ) and fix T` of size Cn/(2 log n). Let ξ(S′, T ) be
the event that all processors in T` have fraction < (1− 0)f ′. Let X be the number of edges from S′
to T`. Since the graph G is k log n regular, we know that Pr(ξ(S
′, T )) = Pr(X < (1− 0)f ′|T |k lg n).
We will find an upper-bound on the latter probability by using a random variable Y that gives the
number of edges from S′ to T` if the graph G were generated by having k log n edges from each vertex
with endpoint selected uniformly at random. In particular, X is the number of edges between the two
sets if G is a random regular graph, and Y is the number of edges if G is a graph where the out degree
of each node is the same but the in-degrees may differ. We know that Pr(X < (1− 0)f ′|T |k lg n) ≤
Pr(Y < (1− 0)f ′|T |k lg n) since the model for generating X assumes sampling without replacement
and that for Y assumes sampling with replacement. We will thus bound the probability of deviation
for Y . Note that E(Y ) = f ′|T |k lg n, and so by Chernoff bounds, we can say that
Pr(Y < (1− 0)f ′|T |k lg n) ≤ e−(k/4)(0)2f ′Cn
= e−(k/12)(0)
2Cn
Where the last step holds since f ′ ≥ 1/3. Let ξ be the union of events ξ(S′, T ) for all possible
values of S′ and T . Then we know by union bounds that
Pr(ξ) =
∑
S′,T
Pr(ξ(S′, T ))
≤ 2n2ne−(k/12)(0)2Cn
≤ e−C′n
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Where the last equation holds for any constant C ′, provided that k is sufficiently large but depends
only on the constants C and 0. We have thus shown that with high probability, the number of
processors with fraction < (1− 0f ′) is no more than Cn/2 log n.
By a similar analysis, letting S′′ consist of the union of S′ and the set of bad processors, we can
show that with high probability, the number of processors with fraction > (1 + 0f
′ + 1/3− ) is no
more than Cn/2 log n. These two results together establish that with high probability, in any round of
the algorithm, all but Cn/logn processors are informed for any constant C, provided that k is chosen
sufficiently large with respect to C and 0. uunionsq
The following Lemma establishes validity (that the output bit will be the same as the input bit of
one good processor) and will also be helpful in establishing consistency (that all but Cn/ log n good
processors will output the same bit).
Lemma 12 If in any given round all but Cn/ log n good processors vote for the same value b′, for
some constant C, then for every remaining round, all but Cn/ log n good processors will vote for b′.
Proof: We will show that if all but Cn/ log n good processors vote for the same value b′ in some round
i, then in round i+ 1, all but Cn/ log n good processors will vote for b′. Consider what happens after
the votes are received in round r. We know that for this round, f ′ ≥ 2/3 + −C/ log n ≥ 2/3 + /2 for
n sufficiently large. Thus, every informed processor in that round will have fraction ≥ (1 − 0)f ′ ≥
(1− 0)(2/3 + /2), and so every informed processor will set its vote value, at the end of the round, to
b′. It follows that all the processors that were informed in round i will vote for b′ in round i+ 1. Note
that this result holds irrespective of the outcome of GetGlobalCoin for the round, even including the
case where different processors receive different outcomes from that subroutine. uunionsq
Lemma 13 If the call to GetGlobalCoin succeeds in some round (i.e. the same unbiased coin toss
is returned to all but O(n/ log n) good players), then with probability at least 1/2, at the end of that
round, all but O(n/ log n) good processors will have a vote value equal to the same bit.
Proof: Fix a round where the call to GetGlobalCoin succeeds. There are two main cases
Case 1: No informed processor has fraction ≥ (1 − 0)(2/3 + /2). In this case, at the end of the
round, with probability 1, all but Cn/ log n processors will set their vote to the same bit. Case 2: At
least one informed processor has fraction ≥ (1 − 0)(2/3 + /2). We first show that in this case, all
informed processors that have fraction ≥ (1 − 0)(2/3 + /2) will set their vote to the same value
at the end of the round. We show this by contradiction. Assume there are two processors, x and y,
where fractionx (fractiony) are the fraction values of x (y), such that both fractionx and fractiony
are greater than or equal to (1− 0)(2/3 + /2), and x sets its vote to 0 at the end of the round, while
y sets its vote to 1.
Let f ′0 (f ′1) be the fraction of good processors that vote for 0 (1) during the round. Then we have
that fractionx ≥ (1 − 0)(2/3 + /2). By the definition of informed, we also know that fractionx ≤
(1 + 0)(f
′
0 + 1/3− ). This implies that
(1− 0)(2/3 + /2) ≤ (1 + 0)(f ′0 + 1/3− ).
Isolating f ′0 in this inequality, we get that
f ′0 ≥
1/3 + 3/2− 0 − (3/2)0
1 + 0
.
A similar analysis for fractionb implies that
f ′1 ≥
1/3 + 3/2− 0 − (3/2)0
1 + 0
.
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But then, for 0 sufficiently small, we have f
′
0 + f
′
1 > 2/3 + , which is a contradiction.
Now, let b′ be the value that all good and informed processors with fraction ≥ (1− 0)(2/3 + /2)
set their value to at the end of the round. With probability 1/2, the outcome of the GetGlobalCoin
is equal to b and in this case, all but O(n/ log n) informed processors will set their vote value to the
same bit b at the end of the round. uunionsq
We can now prove Theorem 3.
Proof: Lemma 12 establishes validity: if all processor initially start with the same input bit, then all
but C2n/ log n of the processors will eventually commit to that bit, with probability at least 1−e−C1n.
Lemmas 13 and 12 together establish that the probability of having a round in which all but C2n/ log n
processors come to agreement (and after which all but C2n/ log n processors will stay in agreement)
is at least 1− 2r where r is the number of rounds in which GetGlobalCoin succeeds. A simple union
bound on the probabilities of error then establishes the result of the theorem. uunionsq
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